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Executive summary
Countries all over the world look for ways to increase their competitiveness. The contribution of cooperating com-
panies in the form of clusters is rather substantial and therefore, for example, the European Union and its member 
states have long been supporting these cooperative efforts. This support may take the form of a more entrepre-
neur-friendly legal environment, initiate cooperation, but it may also mean non-returnable financial contribution. 
This paper does not want to discuss the optimal channels to support clusters, and in particular it does not want to 
study the ways financial contributions are distributed among clusters. Rather, the contribution is an entirely novel 
way to look at the forces that keep some clusters on track while destruct others. 
Longstanding cooperation between companies forms a special complex process hierarchy in clusters. The main 
businesses of the cluster is driven by the actors’ interests in staying competitive, improving competitiveness and 
obtaining high profits both as a cluster, but especially as an individual company. Cooperation and the actors’ 
selfish interests should be kept in balance or else the success of the cluster is in jeopardy and its actors can 
lose both joint and individual profits. Organic relationships and cooperation among companies or a favourable 
business environment is, by no means a guarantee for a working and successful cluster. Clusters operating at 
industrial concentration points, having a critical mass, supporting environment, and a successful cluster manager 
may nevertheless lack success. On the other hand other clusters operating in suboptimal circumstances in theory, 
flourish and produce a high extra profit in practice. This puzzle cries for new models, new approaches for a better 
understanding of the opportunities and decisions that drive the clusters and their actors. 
This paper introduces an entirely novel way to study clusters by looking at the selfish, profit-seeking interests 
of the entrepreneurs, the actors of clusters. The approach, using game theory provides an exact, mathematical 
framework to study the conflict between the fruitful cooperation represented by the cluster and the selfish ways 
of the actors to follow their own – possibly short term – interests. The game theoretic approach makes it possible 
to identify not only good or bad clusters, provide recipes for solutions in some of the bad clusters, but also to 
define golden rules that do not only facilitate the evaluation of existing clusters, but help future cluster managers 
to create better, more stable clusters.
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1 Clusters and game theory 
Without being absorbed in a form and content analysis of the 
companies and the institutions in contact with them, it is nec-
essary to mention the classification made by Jacobs and De 
Man. They define clusters in a three-fold manner as either be-
ing regionally located, as possessing a vertical production and 
supply chain process or third, as businesses that are related by 
some form of narrowly-focused specialization. Links the cluster 
definitions to the development of industrial policy in The Neth-
erlands, and from the discussion compiles a menu of possible 
policies and strategies that can be utilized by both industry and 
government for the furtherance of industrial policy. (Jacobs & 
De Man, 1996)
In conclusion our opinion is that longstanding coopera-
tion between companies forms a special process making 
complex hierarchy which main business motives basi-
cally are driven by the ideas of staying alive and being 
competitive and strengthening this competitiveness as 
well as maximizing the profit. 
The fact that the forms of companies’ cooperation are 
continuously developing and this cooperation has a spe-
cial evolution progress – the successful solutions will be 
commonly used and the less successful initiatives will 
die – is noteworthy as well.
I.2 Clusters
Moving on to the particular subject of the concept paper, it 
would be worth beginning with a definition which clarifies 
the concept of cluster, with one, which is fully accepted by the 
community. In the literature many alternative, overlapping defi-
nitions are used, but there is no commonly accepted standard.
Actually, the most known definition of cluster had become 
public as a result of Michael E. Porter’s work. In the 80’s Porter 
studied the factors of competitiveness. In connection with this 
research he clarified the positive effect on the competitiveness 
of the regional and sectoral cooperation. 
The four factors of Porter’s diamond model (company strategy, 
structure and rivalry; factor conditions; demand conditions; re-
lated and supporting industries) interact with each other to cre-
ate conditions where innovation and improved competitiveness 
occur (Porter, 1990).
Based on this theory he introduced the concept of clusters: ‘A 
cluster is a geographically proximate group of interconnected 
Today the formation of clusters – the collaboration of compa-
nies with each other and with the research sector – is seen as a 
possibility to renew the economy and the society. Clusters have 
been proven as a very promising tool to strengthen the com-
petitiveness of companies all over the world. Competitiveness 
significantly increases among cluster actors which are closely 
located within a region and willing to do joint research, devel-
opment as well as to jointly create innovations. Clusters offer 
a favourable and dynamic business environment (ecosystem) 
where innovative companies can flourish by interacting with 
different innovation actors and across sectoral boundaries. 
Recognizing these positive roles the development of clusters is 
actively supported by policy makers worldwide.
I.1 Cooperation of the companies
History proves that humanity is ready for cooperation and it 
needs cooperation. To put it simply, the modern enterprise is a 
typical product of modern people’s cooperation and the rela-
tions between the enterprises and other organizations mean a 
more advanced stage in the cooperation’s hierarchy.
Alfred Marshall in his book – Principles of Economics (Marshall, 
1890) – shed light on the positive effect of the concentration of 
specialized industries in a particular area. 
His concept was based on a pattern of organization that was 
common in late nineteenth century Britain in which compa-
nies concentrating on the manufacture of certain products 
were geographically clustered. Comments made by Marshall 
(1890, Book 4, Chapter 10) have been used by economists and 
economic geographers to discuss this phenomenon. The two 
dominant characteristics of a Marshallian industrial district are 
high degrees of vertical and horizontal specialisation and a very 
heavy reliance on market mechanism for exchange. Compa-
nies tend to be small and to focus on a single function in the 
production chain. Companies located in industrial districts are 
highly competitive in the neoclassical sense, and in many cases 
there is little product differentiation. The major advantages of 
Marshallian industrial districts arise from simple propinquity of 
companies, which allows easier recruitment of skilled labour 
and rapid exchanges of commercial and technical information 
through informal channels. They illustrate competitive capital-
ism at its most efficient, with transaction costs reduced to a 
practical minimum; but they are feasible only when economic 
of scale are limited. (Wikipedia contributors, 2012; Zaratiegui, 
2002)
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companies and associated institutions in a particular field linked 
by commonalities and complementarities’. (Porter, 1998)
Ketels (2004) draws four critical characteristics to our atten-
tion which is proximity, linkages, interactions and critical mass. 
Understanding the importance of these four dimensions is 
much more important than defining specific benchmarks along 
them that a group of companies and institutions have to meet 
to be called a cluster.
‘The geographic scope of clusters can vary from a single city, 
state or region to a network of companies across state or even 
country borders. There are various clustering forms that may 
ensue to optimise competitive advantage. Clustering can be 
formal or informal, in the public or private sector; horizontal 
or vertical; physical; and even sometimes virtual. In horizon-
tal clustering companies within the same industry sector are 
co-located in a particular geographic area and might share an 
industrial or technological base, operate within a common mar-
ket and use a common purchasing and/or distribution channel 
(Michael, 2003). Vertical networks include horizontal cluster 
participants as well as supply chain members such as suppli-
ers, consumers and related services (Boekholt, 1997). Diago-
nal clustering refers to the concentration of complementary or 
symbiotic activities, whereby each company adds value to the 
other.’ (Braun, McRae-Williams, & Lowe, 2005)
The changes and the improvements of the cluster definition 
were induced by the realization of the influence of the organi-
zations and institutions working in interaction in the market on 
the competitiveness and by the realization of the various forms 
of cooperation of the cluster’s framework. 
‘Comparing the diversity of cluster definitions and approaches 
throughout the literature, three common elements emerge: 
geographic, economic integration, and social elements. In the 
literature, these elements are further divided into a number 
of dimensions (Bryant & Wells, 1998; Enright, 2000; Harrison, 
1992; Jacobs & De Man, 1996; Rosenfeld, 1997, 2001; Verbeek, 
1999), such as geographic localisation, vertical and horizontal 
aggregation, innovation, critical mass, and social networks.’ 
(McRae-Williams, 2004)
We consider it important to mention that the essence 
of clusters is based on empirical examinations and on a 
bottom up procedure. Funding and/or organizing a clus-
ter is an organic instrument of the member companies to 
increase their competitiveness, which has a (back) posi-
tive effect on geographical and economic circumstances 
of a cluster as well. Moreover cluster is an economic 
device in the competitiveness development, with which 
effective utilisation of a region’s resources it is possible 
to realize higher profit than the total profit of the cluster 
actors. From the point of view of this concept paper it 
is important to emphasize the observation implemented 
in cluster definitions – cooperation and competition … 
both of them are characteristic for the cluster actors at 
the same time. But these two opposite attitudes should 
be kept in balance among the cluster actors under any 
circumstances, otherwise either overweight could 
jeopar dize the success of the cluster.
I.3 Cluster development
Thanks to the work of Porter the positive impact of the clus-
ters on the regional economy has become well known fast for 
policy makers responsible for economic development. Taking 
the advantage of this theory numerous economic strategies 
have tried to get the benefit of the clusters’ operation. The 
successful clusters can integrate the regional capacities with 
the special knowledge in their own value chain, which result 
is an advantage that is hardly reached by others. The cluster 
itself is a favourable business environment for the SME’s and 
it helps them (directly and indirectly as well), to easy connect 
to the international economic trends. We can say that the clus-
ters can be ready to be the heart not only of the well-working 
companies but of the regional development as well, thus if the 
cooperation-culture becomes general and is widely used in a 
region, the development of a favourable business environment 
is only a child’s play.
Cluster development programmes based on economic politi-
cal decisions proved that without (strong) base or a suitable 
approach there is no success, there are no successful initiatives. 
Examples for such failures are PANAC (Hungary) or IT Öresund 
(Sweden and Denmark). 
Nowadays it is a fact that the cluster itself can be a useful 
instrument in the economic development, but if the cluster 
funding itself has become the central goal for the cluster actors 
and/or for the economic leaders, then the cluster can miss lose 
his basis basically needed to success. Clusters have to be con-
sidered as tools not as an objective.
Regarding the cluster development our starting-point is 
that the clusters are ‘the product’ of a long term evolu-
tionary process and at the same time they are a success-
ful instrument of the companies’ struggle for survival 
and of obtaining (high) profit. One must therefore pay 
attention to the cluster fundamentals, and the cluster’s 
motivations when evaluating a cluster’s plan of opera-
tion. 
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I.4 Cluster policies and cluster-
based economic development 
Studies about the companies’ cooperation have outlined the 
role of geographical concentration of different activities and 
the conurbational benefits coming from it. From the point of 
view of the development of the cluster it is essential that poten-
tial actors are present in ample number in geographical area, 
exceeding the critical mass. Therefore if statistical evidence 
suggests that in a given geographical area the companies, 
which are willing to join a cluster, are present in higher than 
the average density and their number, size and economic im-
portance achieve the critical mass, an industrial cluster organi-
sation can be founded or the formation is already in progress. 
This method was adopted by Ketels & Sölvell (2004) in order to 
map the new member states’ cluster organisations. 
In the recent years the European Union and some member 
states have rightly committed considerable effort and resource 
to the deeper understanding of clusters. Looking at the Euro-
pean cluster landscape it becomes clear that some clusters are 
more successful than others. Which clusters will likely be suc-
cessful? Which of these is it worth investing in? 
‘In order to facilitate the discussion about cluster policy through 
further insights into the characteristics of clusters and cluster 
policy intervention, the Danish Ministry of Research, Innova-
tion and Higher Education, supported by the German Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology and its national cluster 
program Initiative Kompetenznetze Deutschland, the Nordic 
Council of Ministers and the Nordic Innovation Centre (NICe), 
have initiated the project ’NGPExcellence – Cluster Excellence in 
the Nordic Countries, Germany and Poland’. The overall objec-
tive of this project is to contribute to the development of out-
standing clusters through excellent management and excellent 
cluster programs. … This project pays particular attention on 
characteristics of cluster management organizations and their 
effects on cluster development. … As many cluster manage-
ment organizations are supported through national funding 
programs the project also analyzed 16 cluster programs from 
nine countries in a benchmarking exercise to facilitate a bet-
ter understanding of successful strategies and mutual learn-
ing between the program owners. The project, … , addressed 
two target groups: On the one hand, managers and staff of 
the cluster and network organizations from the participating 
countries, and on the other hand, program owners and policy 
makers responsible for national cluster and network programs 
and policies.’ (Lämmer-Gamp, Meier zu Köcker, & Christensen, 
2011, pp 10–11)
The examination of 16 different cluster programs in Europe 
gave the authors a unique opportunity to describe the charac-
teristics of these programs. Let us summarize the most impor-
tant findings:
  ‘Common to all programs is their rationale of increas-
ing the competitiveness of the national economy through 
the facilitation of collaboration between companies and 
research stakeholders.’ (Lämmer-Gamp, Meier zu Köcker, 
& Christensen, 2011, p 34) But there are different types of 
the 16 cluster programs which serve different purposes. 
The analysis of the objectives and strategies of the different 
cluster program reveals the following main types of cluster 
programs:
I) Cluster programs that focus on regional economic develop-
ment
II) Cluster programs that focus on the development of national 
industries
III) Cluster programs that focus on the commercial exploitation 
of the R&D potential of a country’s economy
  ‘Network programs to support the competitiveness of 
national industries.’ (Lämmer-Gamp, Meier zu Köcker, & 
Christensen, 2011, pp 44–45) ‘Most programs support both 
the establishment of new cluster management organizations 
and the future development of already existing matured 
cluster management organizations. Only a few programs 
concentrate either on the establishment of new cluster 
organizations or the further development of already exist-
ing matured cluster organizations.’ (Lämmer-Gamp, Meier 
zu Köcker, & Christensen, 2011, p 35) e. g. Competence Net-
work Germany, Cluster Offensive Bayern, Norwegian Cen-
tres of Expertise, Arena and Strategic Research Program for 
Centres of Excellence and Research Clusters.
  ‘Most programs do not have particular strategic objectives 
in terms of actors of clusters that are funded, restrictions on 
thematic areas and coverage of the most important business 
sectors.’ (Lämmer-Gamp, Meier zu Köcker, & Christensen, 
2011, p 37) Only Innovation Networks Denmark, the Nor-
wegian Centres of Expertise Program and the Cluster Policy 
Strategy of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg concen-
trate their efforts on the most important business sectors of 
the economy.
  ‘Grant funding is the main instrument of nearly all cluster 
programs, while technical assistance for capacity develop-
ment of cluster management organizations and its members 
is applied by only half of the programs.’ (Lämmer-Gamp, 
Meier zu Köcker, & Christensen, 2011, p 39) ‘The most pro-
grams co-fund initiatives to 50 or 75 per cent of the total 
project budget’ (Lämmer-Gamp, Meier zu Köcker, & Chris-
tensen, 2011, p 41) and a number of cases there is no maxi-
mum funding period for a project or maximum amount of 
funding an applicant can apply for.
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Looking at the European cluster policy landscape it becomes 
obvious that there are similarities but there is no common ’rec-
ipe’ for cluster policies, moreover there is no common ’recipe’ 
for the success, just there are recommendations. The most im-
portant ones were given by the European Cluster Policy Group 
issued in 2011. Building on them the INNO-Net project, the 
TACTICS Reflection Group – the objective of which is to as-
sist the TACTICS’ partners to analyse, develop and propose 
new cluster policy actions and methods of implementation in 
a number of predefined topics such as channelling RDI fund-
ing through excellent clusters or user-driven excellent clusters, 
among others – will issue in 2012 two handbooks on Cluster 
internationalisation and Cluster marketing & branding. 
Is it worth supporting clusters and if yes, how? – such ques-
tions raise a heated debate. As we mentioned before, different 
solutions are adopted. Which one of these is the best? Should 
we give alternative possibilities for the subsidies for the cluster 
managers or for the cluster organizations or for the common 
cluster actors’ projects or just for developing a favourable busi-
ness environment? The success of the cluster development poli-
cies can be measured only after years. And the next question 
this entails: How is it appropriate to measure the effects and 
impacts of clusters? The evaluation targets could be the target 
policy or the cluster program or the cluster organization itself 
or the cluster management. The kind of the evaluation could be 
ex-post, ex-ante, formative, impact evaluation or benchmark-
ing or quality labelling. (Meier zu Köcker & Kind, 2012). More 
analyses were born even in the last few months (e. g. Joenneum 
Research – Policies Graz or The SLIM Project in Sweden). It can 
be seen that Europe and the member states are different and 
not unified. Taking the national characteristics, the ways and 
the methods of the national developments into consideration, 
companies with different conditions and structures, and then 
cooperative and competitive economics have developed … 
there are regions where it is worth to strengthen the ideas of 
cluster initiatives with any kind of support and thereby stimulat-
ing the development of the cooperation’s culture and speeding 
up the infrastructure development of cluster organisations and 
generating the joint investment projects of the cluster actors. 
Parallel to it we have to say that there are regions where the 
direct subsidies for the cluster organisations are not necessary 
at all because the main aim and motivation of the cluster actors 
are the realizable certain and high profit through their coopera-
tion. 
As it was written in the Vienna Cluster Manifesto as well ‘The 
Commission shall further support the statistical analyses of 
clusters as provided in the framework of the European Clus-
ter Observatory. … Member states and regions should, with 
support from the Commission, continue their policy dialogue 
on cluster policy matters to further develop and adapt cluster 
policies to newly emerging needs and challenges and exchange 
knowledge and experience on the evaluation and impact 
assessment of cluster programmes.’ (European Cluster Confer-
ence, 2012, p 3).
This concept paper does not deal directly with the ques-
tion of the clusters’ support, but it is even important 
from some point of view. We have to note though that 
the subsidies of the clusters do deform or could deform 
the organic (economic) process of a cluster development. 
It can happen that the prime motivation of the cluster 
will be the extra profit getting with the help of subsi-
dies or simply the subsidies will become a real part of 
the profit. Therefore the cluster actors will get a false 
understanding of the cluster’s operation and about its 
outcome. In any case – we should take these facts into 
account at the evaluation of a cluster’s operation. 
I.5 The cluster management 
organisation
The cluster management is the result of the conscious clus-
ter development whose task is among others to stimulate the 
organic development of the cooperation within the cluster 
with the help of accelerating the information flow and the 
project generation and providing the necessary competences. 
Of course, the right cluster manager cannot even substitute 
the cooperation between the cluster actors and cannot replace 
the essential motives of the cluster’s operation but it can really 
catalyze the cluster development not only with the realization 
of the above mentioned task but with right position of the mar-
keting & branding and internationalization strategy and with 
solving the problems, debates, etc. The services offered by the 
cluster manager shall be colourful based on the demand and 
habit of the cluster actors and on the activity of the cluster. The 
most important thing is that the cluster manager shall not want 
to get the upper hand over the cluster. Moreover the cluster 
manager cannot lose sight of the fact that the cluster’s success 
always depends on the actors and on their original aim – to 
achieve the maximum profit via cooperation.
I.6 Key elements – Trust and social 
capital
It must be mentioned that a ’program’ cannot be successful 
if the interested parties do not trust each other, they do not 
co-operate or they are not committed to a long term, consist-
ent strategy. ‘The ability of people to work together for com-
mon purposes in groups and organizations is the social capital 
which is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a 
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society or in certain parts of it’ (Fukuyama, 1995). ‘Further 
developed the social capital is the existence of a certain set of 
informal values or norms shared among members of a group 
that permit cooperation among them’ (Fukuyama, 1999). It 
‘refers to the collective value of all social networks and the 
inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for 
each other’ (Putnam, 2000) ‘The literature has discussed 
social capital as a resource at the individual, organization, and 
community level’ (Strauss, 2010). ‘Social capital appears to be 
positively related to organizational effectiveness and to play a 
central role in reducing organizational transaction costs’ (Fuku-
yama, 1995). ‘It also facilitates coordinated action to achieve 
desired goals (Leana & Buren, 1999) justifies organizational 
commitment (Watson & Papamarcos, 2002), and results in a 
significant positive impact on product innovation’ (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). But there are differences between the level of 
the trust and the social capital of the countries, and these dif-
ferences could appear among the regions of a country as well.
From the point of view of this concept paper the trust 
and the social capital is significant with a view to the 
future profit of the trust and social capital. The return 
in the cooperation invested resources is always awaited 
just in the future. 
The present value of the awaited profit is being 
decreased not only by the time-factors but by the risk 
of the distrust (e. g. changing of the economic regula-
tion, deficiency of the cooperation-rules, the problems 
of exercising a right). The more risk is recognised by the 
cooperating partners the less but immediately provided 
advantage (profit) make them give up the cooperation.
I.7 “Cluster illnesses” 
In the last decades extensive studies have been conducted to 
investigate and determine success-factors in clusters. During 
the examinations the characteristics of the clusters have been 
analyzed from a number of points of view. On the basis of 
these examinations we can theoretically and statistically specify 
the kinds of clusters to be funded. Such conditions can specify 
the optimal number of cluster actors or the ideal competences 
of the cluster managers . Theoretically it is also possible for 
each of us to found and build a successful operating cluster or 
catalyze the process. 
Although the theoretical models have been proved in 
the practical life many times, the practical experience is 
not unanimous. What are the problems noticed during 
the last years and the policy makers are willing to hush 
up them?
1/ building up a cartel 
There are forms of the cooperation which are successful for the 
actors but at the same time damaging for the economy (e. g. 
reducing the competition, agreement to the fix prices, market-
ing or production etc.). Cartels are illegal, but even so from 
time to time the companies try to enter into such agreements. 
Cooperation and competition are characteristic for the relations 
of the cluster actors, too, but a successful cluster is not about 
the restriction of competition. We cannot, of course completely 
exclude the possibility of parasites, undesirable groups of com-
panies that abuse cooperation and especially the support for 
forming cooperation to reach their sinister goals. 
2/ no panacea
The well documented success-stories about the profitable and 
favourable effects of the cooperation in the frames of a cluster 
might give the impression that joining a cluster will solve all 
business problems. Participation in a cluster might be a more 
effective way to reach one’s goals, but it should not be the goal 
itself. Managers, who wait for such a miracle, completely miss 
the point and will fail miserably. Companies focussing on par-
ticipation only will not be able to benefit beyond the obtained 
participation. 
3/ herd attitude
To found a cluster – it is trendy nowadays. Business actors often 
feel that it is more profitable to join a cluster than to let the 
opportunity slip away. They do not really think of what this 
seriously means in practice, they are just toying with the vision 
of the word ‘cluster’. The idea of cluster is slowly becoming a 
myth. 
4/ lack of business and ambitions of the 
actors
The cluster itself is an answer for the challenges of the eco-
nomic competition. Increasing the competitiveness of the com-
panies the cluster gives them confidence that they will have 
success in the fields of market struggle. The cluster is not a 
charity organisation, this is actually a secondary result of the 
companies’ activity. Misjudging where the cluster can help its 
actors can lead to bad experiences with any cooperation. 
5/ isolation effect
If the cluster actors do not have enough information to make 
the right decision on their own market position or market 
share, then their cooperation is suffering from an isolation 
effect and their results must be non-competitive in the global 
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market. It means if there is a product in the global market, 
which is more easily and more cheaply available and moreover 
it has a better quality than the product of the cooperation, then 
the cooperation itself is not successful. Why? Because with 
right assessment of the economic situation and also with hav-
ing marketable information and even with involving outsiders 
in the business, successful economic cooperation – including 
the competitive products – would be easily guaranteed. 
6/ growing apace with the subsidies and 
grant dependency/rent seeking
Getting subsidies for cluster development – this is the main 
business of the cluster, therefore the profit increase comes only 
from the subsidies. 
7/ free-riders
The spread of this behaviour, getting the benefits of the opera-
tion of a cluster without any willingness for real cooperation 
could jeopardize the success.
8/ extremes
The overconditioning and overregulation of the cluster’s opera-
tion, the elaboration of complicated rules of procedure, the 
forced and unnatural increase of the cluster actors’ number put 
high risk even on the operation of a successful cluster. 
In the cases the cooperation between companies is 
not the result of an organic development. In a market 
economy a company and its partners naturally have eco-
nomic cooperation and if these relationships become 
serious and intensive then, the partners are ready to 
pave the way for a cluster initiative. But … the natural 
relationships and cooperation between the companies, 
the industrial condensation points which helps the deve-
lopment of clusters and the favourable business environ-
ment could not guarantee the development of a success-
ful and a self-supporting working cluster in an examined 
area. On the one hand there are clusters recognised, 
which operate at industry concentration points, have 
a suitable company size, supporting environment, a 
successful cluster manager etc. and are not successful 
despite these facts. On the other hand other clusters which 
do not operate under above mentioned circumstances 
and thus should in theory die, in practice flourish. These 
facts suggest us to look deeper into the incentives in the 
operation of a cluster. After all, what drives the cluster 
and its actors?
Game theory 13
II Game theory
crab sandwich they realise that they have some common inter-
ests: B could help company A to materialise this brilliant idea. 
For reasons that we do not need to go into here B’s help is 
not enough, at least two companies of this type are needed. 
Fortunately B has contacts with C and D, either of which can 
serve as a second company, in fact A, C and D could also realise 
the project. The CEO of A finds the plan good and suggests 
to share the expected extra profit of 12 million to be shared 
equally among the four actors of this cluster. Will this work? 
The shortest answer is: No. If the companies A, B and C can 
also do the project and obtain the same profit it would be fool-
ish to include D in the project and pay it 3 million, wouldn’t 
it? OK, D can stay on board, but with a much more modest 
share of the proceeds. Oh, but the same argument applies to 
B, or C that are of the same “type” of company as D. So, as a 
matter of fact A takes all and the substitutable members of 
the group get almost nothing. Moreover, even over the little 
payment they would get, the would start an eternal battle any 
two of these trying to skim the third company by kicking it out 
if the business. 
We have only leaped over a tiny detail. A has no contact with 
C or D. A can only cooperate with these companies if B helps 
it, if B is on board, if you like: with B’s permission. While com-
panies A, C and D could realise the project, such a cooperation 
is simply not possible. But then B has a new, special role: B can 
connect A with the right people. If we look at it again, there 
are only two ways the project could be realised: A, B and C or 
A, B and D. As C and D can substitute each other, they will not 
get much of the (extra) profit, the profit is shared between A 
and B. They can share the profit equally as 6–6 millions, but if 
any other distribution emerges neither of them will have the 
possibility to increase its share. After the offer of company A, B 
getting 9 millions is a likely outcome, for instance.
We have noted that C and D are perfect substitutes, in other 
words one of them is superfluous. So why did B suggest two 
partners at the first place? Consider the same setting when D 
is not there: Then only full cooperation of all the parties can 
realise the project. In such a setting B’s role as intermediary is 
secondary, company C can rightly demand a share of the profit 
and this share is a loss to A and B. In other words A and B profit 
from having both C and D in the cluster. 
Finally note that the assumption that a company will cooperate 
for zero profit might sound unrealistic. Of course this is zero 
economic, rather than accounting profit where the company 
has been compensated for all production costs as well as its 
Game theory studies strategic conflict situations. What are the 
characteristics of these situations? Firstly, the parties are selfish: 
for a conflict of companies this simply means that they want 
to maximise profits although in general the utility of the con-
flict’s outcome can manifest in various non-monetary forms, 
too. Secondly, the conflict’s outcome depends on the parties’ 
actions. We call the conflict situation a game and the involved 
parties the players. The name probably comes from the fact 
that the father of game theory, the Hungarian genius John von 
Neumann was originally interested in developing a mathemati-
cal theory of bluffing in poker and his mathematical results 
found applications in economics and beyond only years, dec-
ades later (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).
The strategy of a player determines his actions for every possi-
ble game scenario. As a result, given the strategies of the play-
ers, a game can be played and the outcome can be determined 
by a mediator or a computer. Therefore the payoffs, such as 
profits of the players can also be determined once the strate-
gies are known. 
We can describe a game in various forms, but there is one dif-
ference that divides games into two groups: cooperative and 
non-cooperative games. The difference is in the legal environ-
ment: noncooperative games are played in anarchy, in an en-
vironment where agreements are only kept if the parties are 
interested in keeping them. In cooperative games, on the other 
hand we assume that it is possible to make binding agree-
ments. This distinction is largely due to Nash, who made key 
contributions to both types of games (Nash, 1950, 1953). While 
the language of the two types of games is remarkably differ-
ent researchers have shown that the conclusions drawn from 
the two types of models are essentially the same. The different 
formulation, however means that the two types of games are 
used for different situations: noncooperative games are best 
suited to study the detailed interaction of a few players, while 
cooperative game theory can handle the interaction of large 
groups of players. Since a cluster is a selfish cooperation of 
economic agents, cooperative game theory is the better suited 
of the two to study the interaction. Nevertheless we start with 
a few simple concepts from noncooperative game theory that, 
on the one hand illustrate the modelling power of game theory 
better, and motivate our use of cooperative game theory later. 
But before we move on to the theory let us consider a simple 
story. 
Company A has a brilliant idea that could be developed into a 
very successful and profitable idea – with the right partners. 
The CEO of A meets the CEO of B at a reception and over a 
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opportunity cost (the cost of doing this project rather than in-
vesting its resources elsewhere) and a compensation for risk. 
Getting a zero profit is therefore not the same as not getting 
paid, but a higher profit is naturally preferred. In practice a zero 
profit case will not arise due to imperfect substitutes, capacity 
constraints or switching costs, but these only mildly affect our 
conclusions.
As we have said this story is simple, but real clusters have simi-
lar, though naturally more complex interactions, where the 
same arguments could be used. In the more complex cases, 
however the calculations may be a little more involved requir-
ing a more general and more formal treatment.
II.1 Non-cooperative games
A non-cooperative game consists of three elements. Firstly, N 
is the set of players {1,…,n}, with a generic element denoted by 
i.The set of strategies available to player I is denoted by ∑i. and 
we denote a particular strategy by σi .
1 A strategy profile σ is the 
collection of all the individual strategies. ∑ collects all possible 
strategy profiles. The utility of a player determines the payoff 
of the player given the entire strategy profile. So, for instance, 
if the players have chosen the strategies σ, the payoff of player 
i is given as ui(σ).
First we explain the so-called Prisoners’ dilemma. The story 
goes as follows: after a bank robbery two suspicious persons 
are captured with illegal weapons. The police has no evidence 
that they committed the crime, so the two suspects are inter-
rogated at the same time in separate rooms. Four scenarios 
are possible depending on whether the suspects cooperate 
with the police or deny the crime. If they both deny, the police 
does not have evidence, so they must be released with minimal 
charges for the illegal weapons. If they both cooperate, they 
can be charged with the robbery, but get some reduction of 
the prison sentence for their cooperation. If on the other hand 
one of them cooperates and the other denies, the first is set 
free for the cooperation while the other is put to jail for a long 
sentence that is made even longer by the refusal to cooperate 
with the police. In the following table we present the game 
in normal form, in each case the first value is the utility of the 
first suspect, the second is that of the second suspect in this 
outcome. A longer prison sentence is represented by a smaller 
utility (a negative number with a larger absolute value).
Suspect 1 \ Suspect 2 Cooperate Deny
Cooperate (-5, -5) (0, -10)
Deny (-10, 0) (-2,-2)
1  Prisoners’ dilemma
By the solution of such a game we mean finding the strategies 
the suspects (or players, in general) will choose. The difficulty 
in finding the solution lies in the fact that the outcome and the 
payoffs depend on the strategy of both players. In other words 
a player must choose his strategy making some assumption 
about the other player. 
The inspection of the game in Table 1. suggests that the players 
should choose (Deny, Deny) to get the highest utility. Unfor-
tunately these are criminals, so they might ignore a possible 
agreement before the questioning they might act differently. 
Indeed, if any of the suspects chooses the strategy Deny, the 
other profits from Cooperate. Since the argument applies to 
both criminals, it is not very realistic to assume that any of them 
will think (Deny, Deny) is realistic. If one criminal chooses Co-
operate, the other’s best response is Cooperate, too. This also 
means that if they agreed to (Cooperate, Cooperate) neither of 
them would have a reason to act differently. This is precisely 
the equilibrium we are looking for. 
We call a strategy profile σ* a Nash-equilibrium of a game, if 
the strategy chosen by any of the players is a best response to 
the strategy of the others. Mathematically:
ui(σ*)≥ui(σi,σi*) for all σi.
Situations involving public goods often resemble the prisoners’ 
dilemma. In a cluster the public good is a joint project, where 
the actors of the cluster can choose an effort level to contrib-
ute to this project. While choosing a high effort would be bet-
ter overall, the individual actors prefer to free-ride on others’ 
efforts and spend own resources on own projects ultimately 
leading to the breakdown of the project and a dysfunctional 
cluster. 
In real life we do see public goods realised, and cooperation is 
often possible in similar prisoners’ dilemmas. How can be res-
cue cooperation? A suitable legal framework using hefty fines 
can change the payoffs so that shirking is not a best response. 
We return to this topic in the following section. As the legal 
framework is never perfect, the enforcement may come too 
late, we may wish to look for self-enforcing mechanisms to 
maintain cooperation. 
1 To be precise these are the mixed strategies that include a randomisation over the so-called pure strategies S. 
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If the interaction lasts for more the one encounter the utility 
from a decision must also include the utility from future 
encounters. Mutual trust and mutual cooperation can be 
rewarded by future trust and cooperation. If the probability of 
future encounters is high and value of future money is high 
(the inflation is not too high), it is less likely that a one-time 
defection and the corresponding high payoff is greater than 
the value of future cooperation. 
Note that this value of future cooperation is only there if the 
game is played repeatedly forever or at least is repeated with 
high probability. A cooperation with a definite or likely end 
does not help: in the last period the cooperation breaks down 
removing the incentives in the previous period to cooperate, 
and so on.
II.2 Cooperative games
The main difference between cooperative and non-cooperative 
games is that in cooperative games players can make bind-
ing agreements, i.e. agreements they must keep. In coopera-
tive games the interest is on the formation of coalitions (see 
Figure  2) and on the sharing of the benefits of cooperation 
rather than the means to achieve these. At the same time the 
so-called Nash program works on showing that the very same 
results could be obtained as equilibria of non-cooperative 
games. Put it simply: we can say that cooperative games are 
result, non-cooperative games are method oriented. 
In the following we introduce the basic ideas and terminology 
of cooperative games.
We still have a set of players and this set is denoted by N. Sub-
sets of this set, that is, groups of players are the coalitions. 
Actions, strategies are implicit and are limited to choosing play-
ers for cooperation. Instead of a utility function for individual 
players, we have a value V for each coalition (Figure 3). 
The idea of this value function originates from von Neumann & 
Morgenstern (1944) who determined this value assuming that 
if a coalition C forms the remaining players play against this 
coalition. Whatever C is guaranteed to make from this situation 
is its value. Now we simply give the value of each coalition. 
If we also make the assumption that members of a coalition 
can arbitrarily share this coalitional value then we talk about a 
game given in characteristic function form or simply a transfer-
able utility (TU)-game.
?
2 In cooperative games strategies are limited to the choice of cooperation. In this example the player makes a choice between the “red” and the 
“green” coalitions – or staying with the (“blue”) grand coalition.
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What is the solution of such a cooperative game? In purely 
cooperative games we assume that the grand coalition forms 
where all players cooperate and the solution only specifies how 
the players will distribute the value of the grand coalition. In 
some situations this assumption may be too restrictive. If, for 
instance we want to know if a group of regional companies 
should form a cluster, we may also want to know if all these 
companies have incentives to belong to the cluster. In such a 
case the problem is two-fold: which coalitions form, and how 
do these coalitions share their values among their members. 
For the moment we will focus on games of pure cooperation. 
An imputation is a distribution of the payoff of the grand coali-
tion among its members, such that each player gets at least 
as much as it can get without cooperation, that is, as a single-
player coalition.
As there are no strategies in these games, the equilibria defined 
for non-cooperative games are of no use. There are at least 
two types of solutions and two very popular solutions: the core 
and the Shapley-value. Before we move on to a more formal 
definition we provide the intuition of these concepts by means 
of two simple stories. 
For the sake of this example consider a cluster producing 
and selling furniture. Some of the actors specialise in office, 
kitchen or children’s furniture, others in marketing, logistics or 
producing brass parts. It is natural to assume that the brass 
part manufacturers could form a (smaller) cluster themselves 
and share technology, buy and sell in large quantities etc. etc. 
such a cluster clearly has some potential benefits. Now suppose 
that the furniture cluster generates some extra profit thanks 
to costs savings and extra trade generated. How to share this 
extra profit? 
Of course one should not imagine a pile of banknotes or a sum 
sitting on a bank account: the money is often of the forms 
of cost savings that may be realised unevenly. If therefore the 
brass manufacturers feel that they get less than what they 
could make with the same facilities outside the present cluster, 
they might demand a higher share or threaten to leave the clus-
ter. The higher share of the extra profit is probably in the form 
of higher prices in the contract for brass parts. Is this attractive 
for the rest of the cluster? Well, the rest of the companies could 
also buy the parts from other sources. If the cluster is worth 
more than its parts – it is superadditive – then an agreement 
is always possible. Quite similarly, each group of actors: mer-
chants, kitchen makers, small companies, large companies, etc. 
could – and should – consider its outside options. We say that 
3  The characteristic value of the “red” coalition is classically defined as the minimal value obtained when playing against the complementer coalition, 
that is, the coalition of the remaining players
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the allocation of the extra profits is in the core if all these com-
panies find the allocation reasonable and they cannot – justifi-
ably demand an increase of its actors collective share. 
For the second example consider a cluster of companies build-
ing and using a shopping mall. Different shops or groups of 
shops might have different preferences. The luxury shops insist 
on the marble pavement, the banks want to have high security 
measures, the hypermarket an easily accessible shopping mall, 
the cinema the late opening hours. Each of these demands in-
crease the total cost of the project. The question is: how to 
share the profits when we know that the costs depend on the 
actors’ wishes. One possible method is to use the core again, 
but in this setting the Shapley value is more natural. For this 
number the actors as A1, A2, etc. First assume that only A1 
builds and operates the mall. The costs will obviously be lower, 
but so will be the profits. The difference (possibly negative: a 
loss) is what A1 could obtain on its own Now take A2 and see 
what does it add. The two companies need a somewhat bigger 
mall, may attract more customers, so we can again calculate 
the value for the two-company mall. The contribution of A2 is 
the increase of the profit with respect to the single-company 
mall. Note this amount next to A2’s name. And so on for A3, 
A4, etc. This row of numbers tells us how much each of these 
companies added to the value of the project. Clearly, this order 
is not very favourable for A1: it practically must build the whole 
mall with high costs, while A89 may incur no extra costs at all 
despite a long list of special requirements – already satisfied 
thanks to actors coming earlier. To make this fair we consider 
all possible numbering of companies – there may be very many 
such numberings – and take the average contribution. 
Academics widely consider these methods as acceptable ways 
to share the profits and in fact such metods have been used 
for building airport runways (sharing the costs among land-
ing aircraft, (Littlechild & Thompson, 1977)) or managing the 
Tennessee river (sharing the costs among nearby farms, ship-
ping companies, and cities in the Tennessee Valley (Straffin & 
Heaney, 1981)) among others. In the rest of the section we 
present a short technical summary of these two concepts. This 
section may safely be skipped, this will not hamper the under-
standing of our paper.
The core (Gillies, 1959) is the cooperative equivalent of the 
Nash equilibrium, but it allows also for coalitional deviations 
(Figure 4). The core collects imputations such that for all coa-
litions it holds that the total payoff paid to members of this 
coalition are equal to or higher than the value of the coalition. 
Were this not true, the coalition would not sign the agreement, 
but rather operate on its own. While it may seem rather dif-
4  In the core no coalition of players benefits from forming and leaving the cooperation.
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5  The Shapley-value takes the average marginal contribution of a player. For this all possible orders in which a coalition may have grown are considered.
6 A coalition has no structure
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7 There may be many different network structures supporting the same coalition. Networks a), b) and c) all support the coalition in Figure 1, while 
network d) is disconnected and therefore cannot support the same coalition.
a) Connected
c) Connected
b) Connected
b) Connected
ficult to satisfy the demands of all coalitions most games have 
many imputations that satisfy them. Unfortunately there are 
also many that do not have any. We say that the core of such 
games is empty. So-called balanced games have non-empty 
cores (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). To have an empty core 
means that the total resources available to the grand coalition 
are not sufficient to simultaneously satisfy the coalitional de-
mands.
A whole stream of literature has been motivated by the poten-
tial emptiness of the core either to see what happens in the 
game if the core is empty or to somehow save cooperation. For 
instance the minimal dominant set (Kóczy & Lauwers, 2007) 
contains imputations that emerge dynamically after playing the 
game for long. Approximate cores (Shubik & Wooders, 1983) 
take the costs of forming/breaking agreements into account: 
when these costs are high, higher than the gains from leaving 
the grand coalition, cooperation survives.
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8 Coalitions under network 2a. The coalition in Figure 3a is connected, while Figure 3b is not. Members of the coalition on 3b cannot communicate and 
are therefore not a threat. 
The sharing aspect of imputations is better expressed by the 
Shapley-value (Shapley, 1953), that pays the marginal contribu-
tion to each player. It can be best understood by a story: Initially 
the first player has its own value as a single player coalition 
.The the second player arrives and it contributes the difference 
between the value of this duo and the first player’s single player 
coalition, and so on (Figure 5). We then take all the n! possible 
orderings of the players and take the average of a player’s mar-
ginal contributions. 
The Shapley value is never empty, it is always defined. (Dubey, 
1975; Neyman, 1989; Shapley, 1953) and others have shown 
that the Shapley value determines the only way to divide the 
total coalitional value if we require some simple, often elemen-
tary properties, such as symmetry, to hold. The Shapley value 
gives a fair way to share the coalitional payoff, but it is not 
always a stable way. The Shapley-value belongs to the core in 
so-called convex games (Shapley, 1971), but it may well be that 
the core is not empty, but the Shapley value is outside the core. 
In such games the allocation that is considered fair is simply not 
accepted by all coalitions.
II.3 Networks
Coalitions are a greately simplified version of reality as they lack 
internal structure (Figure  6). In some situations the structure 
of cooperation has a role, too. Where personal connections 
or trust play a role only cooperation between parties that are 
connected to each other personally or who trust each other are 
possible. In such situations a player can have a high value simply 
for connecting other, productive players (Borm, Owen, & Tijs, 
1992; Herings, van der Laan, & Talman, 2005). The core can 
also be generalised to games where the connections among 
the players are important. For such TU games over a network 
we must have a value function and know the underlying net-
work of players.
In network games only coalitions that are connected make sense 
(Figures 7a-c and 8a). A disconnected coalition (Figures 7d and 
8b) means that some of its members cannot communicate and 
therefore coordinate. Such a coalition then clearly cannot form. 
a) Feasible coalition b) Infeasible coalition
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ural choice. Since the participating companies and institutions 
are naturally interpreted as players the question that remains 
is how to find the coalitional values, that is, the characteristic 
function. In other words: what is the value of a coalition?
We see two possible interpretations: (1) Projects as coalitions 
(Figure 9) or (2) Clusters as coalitions (Figure 11). 
III.1 Where are the coalitions in 
clusters?
Projects as coalitions/coalitions as projects
A project is a form of cooperation among actors of a cluster 
that has a clear project plan, project objectives and an estimat-
ed project profit. This project profit is the value of the coalition. 
What are the advantages or disadvantages of this approach? 
The single most important aspect of a project is that it is 
something specific, material and therefore the profitability of 
a project is a natural question, something that is also raised 
by the participants already before joining the project. On the 
By now it may be clear that game theory, especially cooperative 
game theory, models conflict situations very similar to those 
that can arise in a cluster. Over the decades researchers have 
written hundreds, possibly thousands of papers researching 
these games, providing ways to “solve” these games, that is, 
acceptable ways to solve the conflict among the players as well 
as describing properties of these games that guarantee, for 
instance, that a conflict can be a win-win situation. 
In the following we formalise the connection between coop-
erative, so-called TU games and clusters making it possible to 
use the enormous literature written for games to be used in 
the study of clusters. The ultimate purpose of this exercise is 
to translate the game theoretic properties into golden rules for 
cluster evaluation.
Our aim is to evaluate clusters by game theoretic means. This 
requires first the translation of the problem into a mathematical 
format, solve the problem using game theoretic methods and 
translate back the results into practical recommendations. 
We are interested in the possibility and nature of cooperation in 
clusters, so modelling clusters by cooperative games is the nat-
9 Projects as coalitions
Projects as coalition
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other hand we do not only look at the behaviour of a cluster in 
the present, but would also like to understand future contin-
gencies. For that we would need information about future or 
even potential projects. For such projects the same information 
is not available or is not accurate. In a cluster it is perfectly natu-
ral that a cluster actor will participate in multiple projects and 
share its time among these activities. This behaviour is not nat-
ural in cooperative games, coalitions do not generally overlap. 
Overlapping projects can be modelled by so-called (balanced) 
collections (Figure  10). In a balanced collection each player 
spends the same amount of time on the projects including pos-
sibly a project that does not involve other players. The limita-
tion of this setting is in the assumption that a project requires 
the simultaneous cooperation of the players, in other words, 
actors of a particular project/coalition must spend the same 
amount of time on that project/in that coalition. This is clearly 
a restrictive assumption that will not typically hold in a natural 
setting. 
Clusters as coalitions/coalitions as clusters
In general a cluster is not created for a single project nor for a 
small set of projects but rather to be an incubator for new ideas 
and projects. 
Basing our calculations on current projects only can be very lim-
ited and may only be indicative of the minimal potential of the 
cluster. So instead, we see a coalition as a cluster, possibly with 
some ongoing projects, but also with the potential for new 
projects. The value of a coalition is then the present value of all 
future profits coming from the projects from within the group. 
This value is comparable to the value of a stock that is also seen 
as the present value of the future stream of dividends. 
This second concept is much more general. While it clearly 
includes the value of a project if the set of participants coin-
cides with the coalition, it also allows for other projects by sub-
sets of the coalition members. As a special case it includes the 
profit from singleton projects, that is, from projects that do not 
need cooperation with other players. On the other hand it does 
not include the profit of projects that require cooperation with 
outsiders. The complexity of this approach is also its disadvan-
10 Balanced collection: The members of the blue coalition are committed to it, while the members of the purple coalitions share their time between two 
such coalitions each. 
Full-time coalition
Part-time coalitions
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tage. Just as there may be disagreements about the value of 
a stock, the value of such a cluster-coalition is also difficult to 
determine. Especially that the definition of the game requires 
an exponential number of such valuations. 
III.2 About translating clusters into 
games
Game theory is a branch of mathematics with widespread 
applications in business and economics as well as many other 
disciplines from biology to politics. Being a theoretical science 
its models live not even in sterile laboratories, but in the ide-
alised realm of sets and factorials and Greek letters. Real Life 
must surely be more complicated! Has such a model anything 
to do with reality? 
We believe, it does. In fact, it is not only us, but the ocean of 
working applications prove that on the one hand people, but 
especially companies can very well be modelled by the homo 
oeconomicus, the selfish man and on the other, that game the-
ory is flexible enough to accommodate small deviations from 
the standard setups. Is this also the case for clusters? While we 
are quite optimistic, one has to carefully check and investigate 
whether the fundamental assumptions of game theory also 
hold in the setting of industrial clusters.
In the following we outline a set of questions and hypotheses 
corresponding to these basic assumptions. If these hypotheses 
are tested to be valid, a rather standard game theoretic approach 
can be used. If some are found false we may still use the model, 
but with certain modifications. If many of these assumptions 
are false, new richer models need to be developed. We must 
note that this is a very unlikely case and once again point at the 
numerous applications where the game theoretic approach has 
already proved itself useful. 
In the first group of hypotheses we focus on the fundamentals. 
As a first prerequisite we would like to understand what drives 
clusters, what drives the formation of clusters. We depart 
from the usual principal-agent approach where the conflict is 
between the owners and the managers of a company as clus-
ter actors are often too small, owners are often the managers 
as well. We expect the dichotomy to lie between the profit 
or value maximising totally rational faceless investor and the 
entrepreneur who is driven by creativity, by the joy of creating 
something new and the joy of collaborating with others. We 
11  Clusters as coalitions
Clusters as coalitions
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do not say that the two aspects cannot live along each other, 
but before going any further we must understand if the cluster 
is a means to reach a higher profit level, to collect previously 
unrealised profit or it is perhaps the goal itself.
The motivation for this question is clear. While some clusters 
kick off with intense co operation, with very clear goals and 
objectives, there are clusters founded by friends and schoolmates 
with the aim of co-operation with old acquaintances hoping 
that something useful comes out of it – and in the meantime 
the collaboration is fun, all will enjoy business lunches. 
The formation of clusters is supported by national and EU insti-
tutions. In extreme cases obtaining this support can be the goal 
itself. Naturally all clusters must have a project, such clusters 
have such projects, too, but the realisation would be possible 
without the formation of the cluster. Such a cluster is clearly 
about money, so it clearly belongs to the first group, where the 
aim is maximising profits, and the national or EU support is just 
one way to realise this. 
A company is approached by another company to do a joint 
project. The offer covers all project-related costs (including 
standard profit rates to satisfy investors) plus 1% of the remain-
ing profit. Rationally the company should accept the offer since 
every bit of extra profit is great. In practice, however, the com-
pany may be offended by the small share and ask for more or 
reject it. This example of an ultimatum game illustrates that 
economic rationality cannot be taken for granted. 
Hypothesis 1. Companies join clusters as a homo oeco-
nomicus, with the intention to harvest profits that 
could not be harvested otherwise. Other factors, such 
as the joy of creativity and collaboration facilitates this 
co-operation but only play an auxiliary role and can be 
expressed in financial terms.
III.3 The bases of decision making: 
Do actors like proﬁ t? 
Irrespective of the answer to the first hypothesis we would 
like to understand the mechanisms that result in a company or 
other legal entity joining a cluster. We would like to know to 
what extent can these mechanisms be considered as formal. 
Do companies use formal protocols before such a decision is 
made?
The next generation solar panel will be a massive hit: govern-
ments provide better and better incentives to reduce energy 
usage, and on the other hand their high efficiency might mean 
that installing them will be a profitable decision for many homes 
and organisations. Several companies and research groups are 
in the race to come up with the first working model. While 
there is a lot of uncertainty in the patent race, three things are 
clear: the company that can file the patents first takes most of 
the market, the rest may have spent large amounts of money 
on the research, but most of this has just been wasted, and 
money can accelerate the research process. So if you put in 
more money, you are more likely to win, but if you lose never-
theless, you lose more. 
This is a lot like the dollar-auction, where a 100-dollar bill is 
auctioned away, but with the catch that all bids, including los-
ing bids, must be paid. Here the prize is the profit made with 
the product, while the bids are the research costs. Once one 
enters the dollar auction, it is difficult to stop. The difference 
between a winning and a losing bid is just a few dollars so if 
we compare this with the prize, it is surely worth putting it in. If 
all actors think this way, however, the bids can go way beyond 
the 100 dollar figure – we may see this in the research game, 
too: Once in the patent race companies try to avoid being a 
close second either by quitting the game early or by outbidding 
the others.
Our interest in these issues is twofold. On the one hand – relat-
ed to hypothesis 1 – we would like to understand what drives 
cluster actors, what are their objectives. On the other hand, in 
order to use mainstream economic and game theoretic models 
we must have companies that are rational (in an economic, that 
is: homo oeconomicus sense), companies that work on maxi-
mising their profits and make well-informed decisions with this 
objective.
If our hypothesis is false, not all is lost, but a formal analysis of 
strategic decision making would require more complex math-
ematical apparatus.
Hypothesis 2. Companies take conscious decisions when 
joining clusters and this decision is just as formal as the 
decisions when joining any other co-operation.
So what are the pros and cons of joining a cluster. On the one 
hand actors of a cluster expect profits from projects that would 
not realise otherwise or from economies of scale or scope real-
ised through the cluster. What are the costs on the other hand? 
The costs of running a cluster initiative or cluster organisation 
are not substantial when compared to the possible benefits. 
Even if all these costs are for nothing, the losses are not severe 
so however small the probability of realising the foreseeable 
profits is the benefits outweigh the direct costs. There are how-
ever other costs, too. A cluster can only become an incubator 
for new projects if the actors share confidential business infor-
mation. The cost here is sharing this information.
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One thing that is not clear is how deep the economic analysis of 
these companies is. Consider a company making funny T-shirts. 
Creativity is costless so the price of such a T-shirt is really just 
the cost of the T-shirt (for simplicity we say this is 0) plus an 
arbitrary markup for the creative design. Suppose this markup 
is somewhere in the range 1 … 00. The company knows that 
there are many similar shirt-makers around, and they will lose 
customers unless they sell significantly below the average price, 
but make as much money as possible. Say, around half of the 
average price of similar funny T-shirts. How much should it 
value its creativity? What should we say? 
This is a well-known game that has been asked at various audi-
ences, but the patterns are always the same. There are some 
fifties, twenty-fives, … ones. What is the good answer? Let us 
say right now that the correct answer is very difficult, as we 
will see it from the following argument. The naive company 
will just say: we have no info about other prices yet, so we 
might as well choose any number. This is the level-0 argument. 
The level-1 argument is a little more sophisticated: Since no 
T-shirt can be more expensive than $100, if we want to be 
among the cheaper half, we should never say more than fifty. 
Those saying fifty probably think level-1. The level-2 argument 
goes further. Since nobody will sell for more than $50, we can 
only be much cheaper than the average if we do not sell for 
more than $25. But then the argument can be repeated and 
the level 3–4–5– … arguments claim that one should never sell 
for more than (rounding the numbers) 13, 7, 4, 2, … 1. If all 
the companies are fully rational one can only remain competi-
tive if the price is 1. Is this the best way to make profit? Is this 
how the company makes the most profit? Most likely not. The 
company choosing this price is clever enough to make such a 
high-level argument, but fails to realise that not all companies 
are equally sophisticated. A sophisticated company will realise 
not only that the argument does not stop at 50, but also that 
some other companies do not go further. For an accurate an-
swer we must think how sophisticated our competitors may be. 
This depends on the composition of the decision makers, but 
for a general crowd 12 may approximately be a good answer 
(so long as not too many people read this text). 
This example illustrates the importance of understanding how 
sophisticated the actors are. While such a detailed analysis is 
not necessary a number of simple hypotheses clarify the basic 
issues.
Hypothesis 3. Companies do a cost-benefit analysis com-
paring the cost of sharing confidential information with 
other cluster actors and the foreseeable benefits from 
the projects.
As a technical detail we would like to understand how compa-
nies handle future profit streams. Two aspects are considered. 
First: the possible sources of income. Clusters are there not 
only to create a formal environment for current projects and 
co-operations, but as an incubator for future ideas, for future 
projects. In fact, clusters are not needed to complete ongoing 
projects. Do companies understand this difference and include 
future projects in their cost-benefit analysis?
Hypothesis 4. Cluster actors attach value to projects in 
the cluster that are not yet realised.
How is this value estimated? On the one hand companies have 
difficulties even to estimate the value of current projects, how 
could they have estimates the value of projects they do not 
even know who are they with or what will the contents be. 
Such detailed information is difficult to obtain and are super-
ficial. We would, on the other hand understand the long-term 
expectations of cluster actors: do they expect similar profits 
from their cluster participation even after the current projects 
have expired or beyond the current projects? Do they expect 
less or more? How much less or more? It is important to stress 
that we do not need to check the validity of these estimates, 
we only need to understand the information that the compa-
nies base their cost-benefit analysis on.
The profit from (present or) future projects does not come at 
the time of the investment. How is this profit stream aggre-
gated so that it becomes comparable to the costs that occur 
at the time of the decision? (We realise the future projects will 
require project-specific investments that are subtracted from 
the incomes realised at the same time; the profit is the differ-
ence of the two that can at times be negative.).
We consider two possible scenarios. Companies base their 
decisions on predictions for a finite horizon, such as for the 
coming 3–5 years. For this limited horizon it is still possible to 
make relatively accurate predictions based on data and models 
used for “standard” business plans. Longer estimations require 
additional data and perhaps more refined models, the cost of 
which outweighs the increased accuracy of predictions.
Ideally, however, and this is the second option, the present 
value of an infinite income stream should be considered with 
appropriate discounting. This approach is not only useful math-
ematically, but is –theoretically- the common practice to cal-
culate the value of a company with publicly held shares or of 
a real estate. The difficulty lies not only in the estimation of 
future profits, but also in determining the discount factors. The 
discount factor can incorporate, besides the devaluation of cur-
rency also the decreasing probability that the cluster will exist 
or that the company is still part of the cluster.
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The first thing we note is that such a code is essentially about 
the distribution of the profits of the cluster. While the code can 
specify property rights or hierarchies these all have monetary 
values and can be expressed as payoffs. This is especially true 
for the allocation of such rights or duties when applied to 
future contingencies. 
In our first hypotheses in this section we look at the nature of 
cluster codes. We believe that a project does not start until pay-
offs are specified for all contingencies. This really means two 
things: firstly, that companies, when starting a project, realise 
the possible alternative project outcomes. Put it simply: they 
realise that the project can be failure producing a loss, a success 
producing a profit, it can be a huge success producing a profit 
beyond expectations and at last it may create a benefit even 
success, but different from the expectations. Does the code 
specifiy contingencies for all possible outcomes?
Hypothesis 6. The cluster code addresses alternative out-
comes.
Note that the alternative outcomes may be due to external, but 
also internal circumstances or events.
It is also important that the code does not only recognise the 
alternative outcomes, but that it provides rules for allocating 
profits (or losses) for all possible states of the world (up to rel-
evance to the cluster). Do actors consider “unlikely” events 
when making decisions?
Hypothesis 7. The cluster code specifies contingencies 
for off-equilibrium or non-ideal outcomes too.
Let us stress the importance of Hypothesis 7: If this Hypothesis 
is not true profit-seeking companies might join a seemingly –
for them – disadvantageous cluster expecting a different out-
come that, on the other hand, is favourable to them. Instead, 
companies must see clusters as a full package, making a deci-
sion that is rational regarding the entirety of the code. 
In practice we expect a compromise between the two 
approaches limiting a horizon, but discounting future profits. 
How do companies treat future profit streams?
Hypothesis 5. The value of a cluster for a particular com-
pany is discounted money-stream within a given time 
horizon with a discounting reflecting the depreciation 
of the currency as well as the probability that the project 
or stream of projects will be discontinued.
Given our hypotheses about the way companies make deci-
sions about clusters we can move on to the decisions about 
forming a cluster. Some of our hypotheses will likely be false: 
this will influence our models to some extent, but, as we 
have indicated earlier already, this does not normally turn our 
approach invalid. 
III.4 Cluster code – structure: 
Do actors think about present 
and future alternatives? 
In the following we state a number of hypotheses about the 
cluster code. Some clusters do not have a formal contract, but 
operate more on a club-like basis. In such a case by contract 
we mean a collection of formal and informal agreements that 
are nevertheless commonly known to the actors of the cluster. 
In the code we also include the general framework support-
ing the writing of contracts for projects that do not include 
all actors of the cluster. Such a framework does not only pro-
vide a possible legal aid, but outlines the general principles of 
the cluster. These principles determine not only the current 
contracts related to current projects, but form the basis for 
future contracts related to future projects. In sum, by cluster 
code we do not necessarily mean a written, legal code, but the 
de facto standards of behaviour regarding present and future 
agreements. We must underline the crucial role of the cluster 
manager in creating and – in the absence of a legal document 
addressing all issues below – maintaining and enforcing this 
code. 
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IV  Setting the golden rules
Hypothesis 8. A company only joins a cluster if this brings 
additional benefits.
While some of the well-known clusters overseas have emerged 
in an organic way, in Europe it is common to expedite the pro-
cess with a top-down approach, “creating” a cluster. While 
we do not want to speculate on the particulars of this pro-
cess there will be a point when a company makes a decision 
whether to join a particular cluster and at this point the cluster 
is either already existing, or is already forming, but already in 
this latter case the scope of cooperation, the possibilities for 
joint projects as well as some of the cluster code is known. In 
sum, the company has some information – however vague – on 
the prospects with this cluster. 
Given that joining a cluster involves some costs, too, one 
should normally investigate other alternatives. For the moment 
suppose that a company has the possibility of joining one of 
two clusters. Of course it should join the one that brings higher 
profits.
Having clarified the basic framework for decision making and 
having thereby made the connection to game theory we can 
now move on to discuss the cooperation-related decisions a 
cluster actor company must make. Understanding the incen-
tives of the individual companies we can discuss properties 
of the cluster they constitute. In particular we may be able to 
translate game theoretic concepts into golden rules of cluster 
evaluation. As an ultimate goal our model could produce quan-
titative predictions about a cluster’s expected performance or 
stability.
IV.1  Joining a cluster: Do actors 
look for proﬁ t?
Now that the structure of the cluster code, directly or indirectly 
specifying payoffs in all world states is given we can move on 
to the strategic decisions of the companies. 
The first property, Hypothesis 8 is very natural. This corre-
sponds to individual rationality in game theory and is a usual 
precondition for solution concepts. 
12 Only join a coalition for extra profit
+
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Hypothesis 9. If a company has the possibility to join one 
of two clusters the company will join the one that results 
in higher payoffs.
Note that in general companies may join more than one cluster 
and sometimes they do, but this is rare for companies with a 
profile corresponding to the main profile of the company.
So far our hypotheses are hardly more than concompanyations 
of standard assumptions or perhaps some elements of a deci-
sion making process formalised into a statement. Hypotheses 
in the following are far less obvious and while the statements 
are stated as hypotheses, we do not expect that all will be 
accepted. In any case, we must note that if some of these 
hypotheses are rejected that can, in itself, have severe conse-
quences for the behaviour of the cluster. 
In the aforementioned scenario, where clusters are created in 
a top-down approach companies rarely have possibility to con-
sider joining more than one cluster. A typical company will be 
invited to some meeting with the prospect of joining a cluster 
whose code is either already clear or is shaping up. Yet, a 
rational company should, before joining a cluster, do a full anal-
ysis of its options. By Hypothesis 8 it should only join a cluster 
that brings additional benefits. The following statement adds 
a more general condition regarding the choice among multiple 
clusters. 
Hypothesis 10. A company should join the most profit-
able of all available clusters. 
This property is known as coalitional rationality. It has two 
direct implications that are corollaries of this hypothesis, but, 
to be more explicit about these, we state them as separate 
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 10a. A company should leave the cluster if a 
more attractive participation offer becomes available in 
another cluster. 
The word “leave” is to be used with care: being an actor of a 
cluster means that there are rights and obligations. The code 
of the cluster, by Hypothesis 7 specifies these for the event of 
departure, too. Once joined the cluster, a company must take 
the possible punishments into account when contemplating on 
the departure. The more common use of “leave” – and this is 
our understanding – is before joining the cluster, so it is more 
about leaving the negotiations. Here no commitment has yet 
been made, so a company will naturally be attracted by the 
more advantageous terms. 
13  Choose the more profitable cluster
+ +?
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As a minimal requirement the cluster must be more valuable 
than its parts put together (superadditivity at the top level is 
called cohesiveness), but, as we will see this is not sufficient, 
the game defined from the problem must also be balanced 
(Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). First we state a natural con-
dition that corresponds to coalitional rationality in game theory 
and that defines the core.
Hypothesis 11. The code of a cluster ensures that the 
gain of any subcluster exceeds its profit as an independ-
ent cluster. 
A few notes regarding this hypothesis. Firstly, it is important 
to emphasize that a subcluster does not need to secede or 
even organise itself to start a protest to get its share. Getting 
as much as it can obtain on its own is a right that must be 
respected by all parties to facilitate cooperation. This is a bit like 
a seat on an airplane: it is very rare that someone else takes our 
seat as such an action would usually lead to a conflict where he 
or she must give up the seat anyway. The same holds here. No 
fights are required as the rights are respected. A good cluster 
manager can ensure that the allocation of the profits is such 
that the conflict will never arise. To do this the cluster manager 
must be very familiar with the companies’ potentials for coop-
eration.
Secondly this innocent condition is actually a family of a huge 
number of conditions for a typical sized cluster. The number of 
possible subclusters grows exponentially with the number of 
cluster actors: the addition of a single cluster actor doubles the 
number of conditions. Can so many, to a great extent conflict-
ing conditions be simultaneously satisfied? Clearly, if the overall 
gains are less than the total gains of some non-overlapping 
subclusters (a partition of the cluster actors) this is not possible. 
Unfortunately there are cases when the gains of the cluster by 
far exceed the gains of such non-overlapping subclusters and 
still the ideal, stable allocation of the cluster profit is not pos-
sible, or in game theoretic terms: the core is empty. 
Even if the core is non-empty not all allocations are ideal. Can 
such a cluster be saved from falling apart? The good news is 
that it can be. A series of carefully orchestrated changes in the 
code of the cluster will always lead to a stable allocation (a so-
called imputation in the core), moreover the number of such 
changes is only proportional with the number of cluster actors 
and not the conditions in Hypothesis 11 (Béal, Durieu, & Solal, 
2008; Béal, Rémila, & Solal, 2010; Kóczy, 2006; Kóczy & Lauw-
ers, 2004; Yang, 2010).
This is also true if the better offer comes from within the clus-
ter. Indeed, most clusters have far more actors than a typical 
project requires and therefore a cluster consisting of only part 
of the actors of the original cluster (for a clear distinction we call 
the smaller cluster subcluster) would typically be a profitable 
cluster, too. While one often thinks that the whole is more than 
the two parts, crowding effects or the higher costs of manag-
ing a larger organisation creates real life situations where the 
part may be more successful.2 In game theoretic terms we say 
that the game is not necessarily superadditive, that is, adding 
up parts does not necessarily create additional value. 
Hypothesis 10b. A company only joins a cluster if none of 
the subclusters offer better prospects.
IV.2  Cluster code: How to keep all 
cluster actors happy at the 
same time?
In section IV.3 we have looked at the structure or “shape” of 
the cluster code. Now that the basis on which the companies 
joining decisions are made have been clarified we return to 
the cluster code, more precisely the distribution of the cluster 
bene fits. 
It is clear that there is no point in setting up a code that is 
not acceptable to the actors. If the cluster cannot provide bet-
ter prospects than other clusters or its subclusters, some of its 
foreseen actors will not join. 
We must handle two problems (corresponding to Hypotheses 
10a and 10b) separately: External threats are somewhat more 
difficult to study as the threat is often not even on the map, 
but on the other hand the general industrial organisation (IO) 
literature already addresses the issues of competition between 
companies. The competition for a particular cluster actor is, to 
a great extent an issue of competition among substitutes, that 
is, companies that offer similar products or services. In our con-
text the complementarity comes in the form of clusters being 
able to cooperate and produce profits with a given company. 
In the following we look at the internal threats, that is, internal 
conflicts of interests that may destabilise the cluster. Ultimately 
we want to understand what makes a cluster stable against 
such destabilising forces. 
2 Let us already indicate distribuitional effects too: the whole may be more than the parts, but if the gains cannot be distributed in a mutually satisfactory 
way cooperation may break down.
30 Cluster games
IV.3  Social networks: How do 
projects form?
The expression “social network” is now widely associated with 
Web 2.0 sites and especially social networking sites. When we 
think of social networks and business we tend to associate to 
new websites – the development of the world wide web into 
this direction has very quickly dominated the original concept 
of social networks. While today we tend to see social networks 
as a way teenagers waste their youth although networking 
came way before the social networking sites or even the whole 
world wide web. 
Networking is to build contacts for a possible future coopera-
tion. Indeed, a cooperation is only possible if the parties know 
each other. Of course we do not talk about cooperation that is 
limited to putting together a product of the parts some cluster 
actors produce, but of projects where know-how, experience 
and business ideas are shared to achieve a better product. The 
underlying social or communication network also determines 
the cooperation possibilities for the cluster. Only connected 
projects are possible: projects where any two participants 
can be connected by a series of acquaintances. It is natural to 
extend this idea to clusters and subclusters: if a cluster consists 
of more than one component that are not connected to each 
other no joint projects will be possible, so having these compo-
nents in a common cluster does not bring additional benefits. 
Hypothesis 12. A (sub)cluster must be connected: Any 
other actor must be a friend’s friend’s … friend. 
We realise that a cluster may also be successful as a club in 
helping actors to new acquaintances this being possibly the 
most direct way to obtain more than the parts put together. 
We do not want to underplay the importance of new friend-
ships, but due to their uncertainty (we do not know who will be 
our next friend, even), the companies’ decisions in joining one 
or another cluster cannot be made on the basis of these pos-
sible connections. Once these possible connections are realised 
the network of connections must be redrawn.
If Hypothesis 12 is found to be true we must slightly modify the 
evaluation of the cluster. Not all subclusters can form, rather: 
typically most cannot form as most are not connected. We can 
still consider our previous model, where the connections are 
ignored by simply setting the value of impossible subclusters 
to zero making them unattractive. In other words, actors of 
impossible clusters will never be unsatisfied as a group about 
the allocation of profits in a cluster. With this change the very 
same approach can be used as when the network of connec-
tions is ignored. 
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V Hypothesis testing
As a simple example consider the so-called ultimatum game. 
This game is about sharing a fixed sum, such as €100. The first 
player can propose a division, the second player can either 
accept or reject this. If the second player accepts, the division 
is final and the players get the corresponding sums as payoffs. 
If the second player rejects, the players get nothing. A rational 
second player focussing only on the payoffs should always 
accept the proposal, even if she is only offered €1 as this is still 
more than nothing. In a laboratory the parties are randomly 
matched out of the 12–20 participants so that the first player 
cannot be identified (and also the first player does not know 
the identity of the second player) and therefore personal ties, 
reputational issues should not play a role. In practice, however 
such an offer is rarely accepted, even offers close to the 50–
50 distribution are sometimes turned down suggesting that 
second players are willing to incur costs in punishing in what 
they see as a deviant behaviour. Interestingly, a series of ex-
periments have found that cultural aspects play a crucial role in 
determining what an acceptable proposal is: in cultures with a 
high degree of self reliance only little transfer is expected, while 
in societies where cooperation is essential for survival players 
may allow only a smaller share to be kept by the proposer. 
The ultimatum game is, of course, just a simple example, but 
such simple games give us information about the way partici-
pants make their decisions. Of course hundreds of experiments 
have already been conducted, but these experiments typically 
involve undergraduate economics students with fresh memo-
ries of their game theory courses. The main reason for this is 
that research is typically conducted at universities where stu-
dents are – thanks to the financial compensation – readily avail-
able. The second is that research budgets are always too tight 
so that the financial compensation offered in an experiment is 
less attractive to businessmen. This of course limits the applica-
bility of those experimental results to our hypotheses requiring 
new experiments.
V.2 Proﬁ tability
While the questionnaires and experiments help us to gain gen-
eral information about decision making in clusters, the second 
group of data is cluster-specific. Ideally we would like to have 
a figure for the cluster and all its subclusters that describe its 
profitability. This is an enormous amount of information that 
are not only sensitive data, but most likely this information is 
not at all available. In practice we do not need precise data, we 
need the profitability of the different subclusters, as perceived 
by the potential actors. In other words, we do not need to 
We have stated a dozen hypotheses about the way clusters 
operate (Hypotheses 1–12). In Section I we have given an 
extensive overview of the literature of cluster evaluation. One 
would rightly expect that such an amount of literature will 
answer some of our points. Our approach is, however rather 
novel focusing on the individual companies’ incentives and 
decision making mechanisms that are quite different from the 
usual data that are more statistical in nature.
We have made every effort to answer these questions using 
our expertise in clusters and in game theory, but in the absence 
of an empirical investigation our conclusions remain just specu-
lations. In the following, however we outline how the missing 
information could be obtained. 
V.1 Fundamentals of decision 
making
We must, first of all understand if the cluster actors make 
decisions along the rationality principles we have outlined in 
the first set of hypotheses (Hypotheses 1–7). This requires a 
detailed insight into the decision mechanisms of cluster actors 
as well as the organisation and code of the cluster. We see two 
methods to collect such information. 
Firstly we need to conduct interviews with the cluster actors’ 
decision makers and the cluster manager. The interviews would 
follow a formal protocol, and with the help of economic psy-
chologists the answers would be collected in an indirect way. 
Direct questions would not necessarily result in answers cor-
responding to the reality: when asked, whether they make sen-
sible, economically well-founded decision mechanisms compa-
nies would be inclined to say yes even if this is not the case just 
to draw a better image of themselves. 
Out second method would draw on the methods of experi-
mental economists. We would like to conduct simple laborato-
ry experiments to find out the motives of the decision makers. 
An economic experiment is conducted in a computer labora-
tory consisting of a server and a collection of workstations. 
Participants make decisions using this computer interface, and 
depending on the participants’ decisions the rules of the game 
determine the individual payoffs. This setup has been intro-
duced relatively recently and it is only the last few years that 
experimental economics grew into a fully recognised discipline. 
One of the reasons might be that the results are often surpris-
ing, demonstrating that culture and morals.
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At last, one may resort to questionnaires and interviews asking 
about business partners, although such “soft” information is 
more likely to be imprecise and incomplete and companies are 
likely to be reluctant to share such valuable information.
V.4 Conclusions on the data
Our aim is to study the micro-level incentives and therefore we 
need micro-level data. The incentives we uncover determine 
the internal stability of the cluster. The quantity and nature of 
the data needed for the game-theoretic analysis is therefore 
quite different from the usual benchmark-based evaluation of 
clusters. This does not necessarily mean that we must throw 
away single-number parameters. Once we get a deeper under-
standing of, for instance, the usual structure of the network of 
connections within a cluster, we can simulate similar networks 
and discover correspondences between the size of the cluster 
in terms of actors, the number of “friends” the average actor 
has. On the other hand there may be a (negative) correlation 
between the number of friends for the average actor and the 
geographical dispersion of the cluster. Unfortunately, to make 
use of such, readily available indicators one has to explore the 
relations with the more detailed data.
conduct extensive economic analyses for all the (exponential 
number of) subclusters, but only approximate figures, as seen 
by the companies. 
We are considering several possible methods to obtain relevant 
data realising that the cluster actors may or may not be too 
keen to spend time on such studies, but the details are still 
open for further research.
V.3 Networks
At last, for an analysis that takes the social or economic net-
work within the cluster into account, we must have information 
about such links. We see 3 ways to gather such data. Firstly, 
when trying to obtain the value of subclusters, their actors 
might simply respond that they do not know these people and 
therefore cannot give an estimate of the value or profitability 
of that cluster. In practice, however, it is unlikely that such 
detailed information is available, the value of the clusters must 
be estimated in some other way, which takes us to the other 
two options. 
A well-managed cluster is likely to have detailed and well doc-
umented information about past instances of cooperation as 
well as past business transactions. It may also have informa-
tion on how the various cluster actors got involved, perhaps 
via other cluster actors. This is “hard” information on business 
relations and is informative not only about the existence of eco-
nomic links, but also the intensity of these links. 
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VI  Conclusion
For policy makers and organisations in some form or other 
interested in cluster support giving them more clear picture 
about the operation and risks of the cluster operation which 
helps to subsidize the clusters’ development more effective and 
purposeful.
We do believe that the game theory can seriously influence the 
research regarding clusters, networks and other co-operations 
among companies. We must admit that in using our game the-
oretic approach for real-life clusters might have some practical 
difficulties might arise. We believe that these difficulties may 
be overcome and the benefit is a model that could show us the 
best way to maximize the outcome of our all investment as a 
cluster actor. 
What does the game theoretic approach contribute to the 
understanding of clusters? In economics game theory has 
brought a complete renewal beginning in the 1950s. While 
earlier models focussed on profit maximisation and other – 
otherwise valid – arguments, ignored the obvious fact, namely 
that the interactions are, after all, driven by the individual actors, 
players, who will play according to the rules and incentives. 
By understanding the incentives of the individuals better we 
understand the nature of interactions: in this case the efforts 
put into the cluster better. 
Our model is not omnipotent. Just as microeconomics must 
use demand and production functions we also need a lot of 
information and game theory cannot tell the prospects of a 
cooperation. Whether a product is good or bad, or how the 
economic climate might change in the near future are ques-
tions that are beyond our model. 
But after testing of the hypotheses our model will present the 
possibility to identify such kind of regularity which will help 
all the cluster actors (policy makers, cluster managers, cluster 
actors …) to recognize better and sooner not only the risks 
regarding cluster operation but the methods how we can 
reduce these risks as well. We do hope that with the help of the 
game theory the cluster actors after weighing the opportunities 
up will be able to make rational decisions.
Our results will be also useful for training cluster managers so 
that the cluster manager him/herself shall help the operation 
of the cluster as a real “quizmaster” to reduce the recognizable 
risks, to initiate new projects, to support the implementation of 
the projects and last but not least to increase the “value” of the 
cluster in the actors’ eyes.
They will also be useful for training cluster actors so that they 
will be ready to make a rational evaluation on one hand on 
their own value among the cluster actors cooperating in the 
cluster organisation and on the other hand on the cluster 
actors as well. They get to know the motives for the real co-oper-
ation and they can prepare themselves for the risks too. Being 
in possession of this information they will be able to make an 
established decision on what is the cluster worth and how they 
can use the co-operation within the cluster to increase their 
own profit.
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Peter Gabriel, Katrin Gaßner, Sebastian Lange
Countries all over the world look for ways to increase their competitiveness. The contribution of 
cooperating companies in the form of clusters is rather substantial and therefore, for example, the 
European Union and its member states have long been supporting these cooperative efforts. This 
support may take the form of a more entrepreneur-friendly legal environment, initiate cooperation, 
but it may also mean non-returnable financial contribution.
This paper introduces an entirely novel way to study clusters by looking at the selfish, profit-seeking 
interests of the entrepreneurs, the actors of clusters. The approach, using game theory provides an 
exact, mathematical framework to study the conflict between the fruitful cooperation represented by 
the cluster and the selfish ways of the actors to follow their own – possibly short term – interests. The 
game theoretic approach makes it possible to identify not only good or bad clusters, provide recipes 
for solutions in some of the bad clusters, but also to define golden rules that do not only facilitate the 
evaluation of existing clusters, but help future cluster managers  to create better, more stable clusters.
